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Independent Verification

Don't take our
word for it.

Every clearance decision MURAQIB makes is sealed into a tamper-evident record. Each entry is cryptographically linked to the one before it, and the sequence is periodically countersigned with a key held offline — outside the production environment entirely.

This page publishes the public half of that key, and the tool anyone can use to check the record for themselves. No account. No installation. No need to take our word for the arithmetic.

The Key

The OQIRON anchor key.

Published here, on a domain OQIRON controls, deliberately separate from any evidence file we send you. A key that travels inside the file it validates proves only that whoever built the file held the matching private key — not who they were. Obtaining it from here instead is what makes the check meaningful.

Public key RWSiofWEp7c6W3rnHzNw6KdRPsp1GYIlXavSaRhTfaj7IDlXrnLflnE5
Key identifier 5B3AB7A784F5A1A2
Algorithm Ed25519 (minisign format)
Purpose Countersigning MURAQIB production evidence checkpoints
Published 5 August 2026
Custody The private half is held offline and has never been present on any OQIRON server. Signing is a manual, human-performed step.
Why the key is public. A verification key is meant to be published. It can confirm a signature; it cannot create one. The security of the record rests on the private half never leaving offline custody — not on this value being secret. If you have received an evidence bundle from OQIRON, check the key in that file against the value above before you rely on it.
Policy pin 16 October 2026
What it is The signed digest of policy_core.py and policy_core_adapter.py — catalogue count 59, adding CLR-03 (declared payload hash match).
Not an anchor This is not a chain anchor. It is signed by the same offline key (5B3AB7A784F5A1A2). That is a disclosed limitation: both are bare digests signed by one key, so a signature carries no marker of which purpose it was made for (whitepaper §11.2.9, see also §7.4).
sha256 of .digest a06a4ab375f98410a22a5bb35cc88285f1b2935f9700301084eac5c7e8b65f0c
Policy pin 31 October 2026
What it is The signed digest of policy_core.py and policy_core_adapter.py — catalogue count 68, adding CLR-04 (release content equals the held content) and the eight mandate controls MND-00 to MND-07; DLE-01 and EXC-01 changed.
Not an anchor This is not a chain anchor. It is signed by the same offline key (5B3AB7A784F5A1A2). That is a disclosed limitation: both are bare digests signed by one key, so a signature carries no marker of which purpose it was made for (whitepaper §11.2.9, see also §7.4).
sha256 of .digest dc331d28b488bfcce1ef53f1ffa3c543a3651779ee7f4b3d87118aef4591731c
Sandbox checkpoint key RWS0FYsMyPobJo8k+bdXFSTHatyRG3cFtlWmV8fkxymQ+m9FOmJLGKP8
Key id 261BFAC80C8B15B4
Scope Sandbox only. It signs checkpoints of the sandbox evidence chain (the chain to which the rail now routes agents whose ids begin SANDBOX-), and nothing else: never a production anchor, a policy pin or a mandate. Older evidence from such agents that was sealed to the production chain is anchored by the production key, not this one. The rail refuses it for the production chain, and refuses the production key for the sandbox chain.
First use 17 October 2026: sandbox checkpoint 1, covering sandbox seq 43164.
File oqiron-sandbox-checkpoint.pub · sha256 f93d4c1fca373d561862ff72732986f03bd1839570ab8651a1a53aedf0f46c93
How To Verify

Three commands. Nothing to install.

The verifier is a single file of standard Python. It reads no network, touches no database, and imports nothing beyond the language itself — so it runs on a locked-down machine where installing software is not permitted.

1

Get the tool

Download muraqib_verify.py from the public repository. It is open source under the MIT licence — read it, modify it, or write your own from the published specification.

2

Get the evidence bundle

OQIRON, or the institution being examined, supplies the bundle: a single self-describing file containing the sealed record and its countersignatures.

3

Run it with the key from this page

Supplying the key yourself is the stronger form of the check. The tool will tell you which form you used.

# check the record, using the key published above python3 muraqib_verify.py bundle.json \ --pubkey RWSiofWEp7c6W3rnHzNw6KdRPsp1GYIlXavSaRhTfaj7IDlXrnLflnE5
# more detail, or machine-readable output python3 muraqib_verify.py bundle.json --verbose python3 muraqib_verify.py bundle.json --json

Requires Python 3.8 or later, which ships with macOS and most Linux systems. The tool exits with a distinct code for each outcome, so it can be run unattended as part of an audit pipeline.

Reading The Result

What a pass means — and what it does not.

A pass proves

  • Every entry present is linked to the one before it, computed independently from a published starting value.
  • Nothing within the countersigned portion has been inserted, reordered, or edited since it was countersigned.
  • The countersignature was produced by the holder of the key above.
  • Where an entry's contents are disclosed, they match the fingerprint sealed for them.

A pass does not prove

  • That what was recorded was true. The record proves what was written and that it has not changed — not that it was accurate when written.
  • Anything about entries whose contents were withheld. Treat those as unexamined, not as verified.
  • That the selection of what to disclose was made impartially.
Known Limits

Stated here, so you don't have to find them.

A verification tool that hides its own boundaries is not a verification tool. These are the limits of what this one can establish.

Withholding permits concealment, but not falsification

Whoever assembles a bundle may withhold the contents of any entry, supplying only its fingerprint. The verifier cannot distinguish an entry withheld for confidentiality from one withheld because its contents are unfavourable.

What withholding does not permit is substitution. The fingerprint published for a withheld entry is a binding commitment to its original contents. A different version cannot later be produced that matches it — so if the true entry ever surfaces, from a subpoena, a counterparty, or another copy, any substitution becomes evident. The recipient of a bundle should decide independently which entries must be disclosed in full, and treat every withheld entry as unexamined.

Entries after the last countersignature

Records are countersigned in batches, so the most recent entries are normally linked but not yet signed. That is the ordinary state of a record still being added to, and the verifier reports the count plainly rather than treating it as a fault.

Removing the most recent countersignature from a bundle would enlarge that unsigned portion. The verifier raises a prominent warning when it exceeds a tenth of the record — but a recipient should confirm the date of the latest countersignature from a source other than the bundle itself.

Integrity is not accuracy

This is a record-integrity tool. It establishes that a sequence of decisions existed in a particular order at the moment it was signed, and has not been altered since. Whether each decision was correct is a separate question, answered by examining the decisions themselves — which is what full disclosure of an entry is for.

Open Source

Read the code. Or write your own.

The verifier and the full bundle specification are published so that a third party can reimplement the check independently. A verifier nobody is permitted to inspect is a verifier nobody should rely on.